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“However, the difference in legal infrastructure does not result from the California legislature's efforts to provide the proper 
conditions for the development of high technology industrial districts. Rather…. a serendipitous result of the historical coincidence 
between the codification movement in the United States and the new state's efforts at developing a coherent legal system out of its 
conflicting inheritance of Spanish, Mexican, and English law.” 
 
Introduction 
 
The Lisbon Agenda, which has attempted to combine the attainment of ambitious 
competitiveness goals with social progression and inclusiveness, places Europe in a 
uniquely difficult position globally, most particularly as an example of an experiment 
which many consider to be doomed to failure.
1 As Europeans continue to examine ways 
in which Europe can become more economically competitive (compared, in particular, 
with US economic indicators) the focus has increasingly been on regulation and its effect 
on entrepreneurship, productivity, business growth, and capital liquidity. Assessing this 
effect or relationship is complex for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is clear that many 
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  1non-regulatory factors contribute to economic and competitive success.
2 Legislative 
policy is not the only significant element in the creation of conditions which are 
conducive to competitiveness, innovation and productivity. Furthermore even if we can 
agree that regulatory and legislative frameworks are important, sometimes the effects of 
regulation are difficult to predict. Secondly, within the European Union there is evidence 
of internal conflict within the Commission as to the relative importance of the Lisbon 
goals and in particular regarding the relationship between the competitiveness goals and 
the social goals of Lisbon. This, in turn, has led to a failure to engage in a profound way 
with assumptions around what can be loosely described as cost-benefit analyses
3, in other 
words a failure to grapple effectively with the difficult task of balancing goals which, 
despite protestations to the contrary
4 do conflict. Thirdly, the experience of distinct 
member states presents challenges.
5 Despite considerable attempts at harmonisation 
substantial regulatory differences exist between members states and in addition 
substantial differences exist between the relative economic performance of member 
states. More confusingly, economic performance within different states over the last ten 
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workers to combine work and family life and falling birthrates in Europe. For an interesting study on 
reasons for success of some industrial districts in the US compared with others (Silicon Valley CA and 
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  2years delivers no clear lessons regarding the relationship between regulation and 
competitiveness.
6 Nevertheless, undaunted by the complexity of these issues the 
European Union has embarked on a path which attempts to provide definitive insights 
into the effect of particular types of regulation on businesses. The European 
Commission
7 has estimated that the cost of regulatory compliance obligations on 
businesses in the European Union is between 4% and 6% of GDP and that 15% of this 
figure is avoidable ‘red tape’ (the term used to specifically signify unnecessary 
compliance burdens). Member states
8 have embraced this Better Regulation project with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm. This paper will, in the first part, consider the position of 
the EU at present in the context of the Lisbon agenda following the midterm review in 
2005. The second part will consider some of the difficult questions surrounding the 
relationship between legislative policy, regulation and competitiveness, particularly as 
experienced within the EU. The third part will discuss the response of the EU 
Commission to these difficult questions and will examine the Dutch
9 and UK approaches 
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  3to the reduction of the regulatory burden, as examples of leaders in the field, in the 
context of the recently announced EU project.  The final part will raise some critical 
points regarding likely outcomes as we rapidly approach 2010, the year for attainment of 
the Lisbon goals.  
 
Part I: European Competitiveness: The Challenges of Lisbon 
Introduction 
   
Everyone has heard of the Lisbon agenda, first declared in 2000 at the Council of 
Europe meeting held in that city.  In 2005 the mid term review of how the Lisbon agenda 
was progressing involved a harsh reassessment of how Europe was measuring up to its 
own stated goals.  President Barroso made it clear that the ‘golf umbrella effect,’ in other 
words the trend which had seen the Lisbon agenda grow in inclusiveness to a staggering 
117 different policy initiatives, had to be  urgently addressed, a realignment or revision of 
progress had to be embarked upon and a refocusing of efforts on core goals had to be 
achieved.  In addition to this politically generated over inclusiveness and consequent lack 
of focus, by 2005 it was clear that the Lisbon agenda meant different things to different 
parts of the Commission, some emphasised economic growth and creation of jobs and 
support for industry, while others took heart in the phrases which consistently set these 
economic goals in the context of a wholehearted pursuit of the European social model.  
This intra institutional conflict is also reflected in differing positions of member states 
and the EU citizenry with rejection of the European Constitution for example, giving 
expression to such concerns in France at the dismantling of the social Europe. Politically 
the UK would normally take a much more pro-market, anti interventionist approach as 
would its neighbour, Ireland, up until recently one of the most successful economic areas 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
 
  4in the Euro zone over the last decade. 
10 Nevertheless, the essential hall mark of the 
European approach to continued prosperity is the view that these goals are not in conflict, 
an ambitious and visionary idea which is really at the centre of European progress.  The 
difficulty is that sometimes there are conflicts which are both difficult to explain and 
difficult to resolve.   
“The goal of the Lisbon partnership for growth and employment is to modernize our 
economy in order to secure our unique social model in the face of increasingly global 
markets, technological change, environmental pressures, and an ageing population. This 
strategy is also to be seen in the wider context of the sustainable development 
requirement that present needs have to be met without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.”
11
Mid Term Review 2005 
The original period for achieving the ambitious Lisbon strategy was the 10 years 
from 2000 to 2010.  Thus 2005 prompted much soul searching, research and positioning 
as a ‘mid-term’ review of the Lisbon Agenda was embarked upon.  A number of key 
documents presented by the EU included the Kok Report(2003) the High Level Group 
Report(2004) and in February and July of 2005 respectively, communications from the 
President of the European Commission, President Barroso and Communications from the 
Commission on the Social Agenda. At the same time 2004 saw a significant enlargement 
of the European Union including the absorption of Poland, which is significant both 
politically and in terms of population, and other countries from the former Eastern 
Europe. 
In its report on the future of European Social Policy in an enlarged Europe, the 
Commission-appointed High Level Group noted in its report that ‘there is a distinct 
European social model’ marked by ‘the consistency between economic efficiency and 
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  5social progress.’ In identifying the following three significant features of the social model 
the Group very clearly accepted a distinctly communitarian philosophy which many 
consider central to the European social model.
12  These features are firstly, a compromise 
between the state and the market, secondly, a compromise between labour and capital and 
finally a compromise that must be made between the welfare state and individual 
responsibility.  In describing the social model in these terms the report noted  that in the 
1960s when the distinctively European approach was being developed by the original six 
member states the  ‘conditions were excellent’ with strong economic growth, low 
inflation, confidence in public affairs as well as in individual rights.  The report also 
noted, in relation to the labour market, that law and collective bargaining played a ‘key 
role.’ However, it was clear that in the new millennium these conditions no longer 
persisted and thus Europe faced a challenge to adapt ‘the balance between economic 
efficiency and social progress’ to take account of a changing economic environment and 
social context.’ 
 The High Level Group report reiterated a commitment to the three-pronged 
integrated approach to social, economic and employment policy.   It described how from 
1995 onwards and towards Lisbon the EU and its member states “started revisiting their 
approach to social policy: affirmation of employment as an objective, and not only as an 
outcome of economic policy; increasing attention paid to social policy as an investment 
(and not only as a cost) and to the ‘productive’ role of social policy within the framework 
of a virtuous circle combining flexibility and security, adaptability and employability.” 
The report emphasised the importance of developments of the EU in this direction from 
the mid 90s with the accession of Sweden and Finland, acknowledging the Scandinavian 
influence on thinking on these matters, on to Maastricht (1992) and the Social Charter 
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Studies 155.  Hansmann and Kraakman, supra n.  WT Allen, “Contracts and Communities” (1993) 50 
Washington and Lee Law Review 1.  
 
 
  
  6and on to Amsterdam (1997) when the Maastricht Protocol was incorporated into the 
Treaty, and finally to Lisbon “with the affirmation of the integrated objectives and the 
launching of the open method of co-ordination
13 as a new instrument to address social 
policy issues.”  The integrated approach, which was fully articulated at Lisbon 
emphasised the view that these objectives and policies are not in conflict but can 
reinforce each other. In fact the Scandinavian influence underlined even more the 
‘Europeaness’ of the Lisbon Agenda by insisting that social protection and economic 
progress were two sides of the same coin rather than twin track goals.. 
By the mid-term review period of 2005 however, the core objectives of  the 
Lisbon strategy seemed less a reflection of reality and more a collection of noble 
theoretical assertions. Unemployment still remained  a significant problem in the 
European Union averaging at 9%, compared with a much lower 4-5% in the United 
States. Labour market participation figures compared unfavourably with the United 
States outside the core group of male workers of prime age
14 and GDP growth was lower 
than the projected annual rate of 3%, with figures for the US being much healthier. In 
2000 the Lisbon Agenda had stated that ‘an average economic growth rate of around 3% 
should be a realistic prospect for the coming years.’ Since 2001, the European Union 
growth rate which had been of 3.5% in 2000, hovered between 1.6% in 2001, 1.1% in 
2002, and 1.3% in 2003. The forecast for 2004 was 2.3%.(High Level Group Report; 
2004) . The Report went on to observe that 3% does not look like “a realistic prospect for 
the coming years.”
15 In 2006 the overall growth in GDP was 2.7% in the Euro Area and 
2.9% in EU25 compared with 3.3% in the US and 2.2% in Japan.  2006 was an 
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  7improvement on 2005 where figures were 1.4% for Euro Area and 1.7% for EU25.
16 Yet 
despite these negative indicators and despite ominous statements from the Kok Report 
(2003) on performance of the social aspects of the Lisbon Agenda in the context of 
enlargement, the Report of the High Level Group stated (in a surprisingly confident 
manner) that the first phase of the implementation of the Lisbon strategy was almost 
complete!!! It acknowledged however, that ‘many actors stress the gap between statement 
and reality.’ 
 
 
The subsequent Communication from President Barroso acknowledged the 
difficult economic conditions which had occurred since Lisbon but more significantly the 
President also noted that the failure of Lisbon to meet its mid term goals could also be 
attributed to a ‘policy agenda which has become overloaded, failing co-ordination and 
sometimes conflicting priorities.’ (the ‘golf umbrella’)In fact the Presidential address was 
quite overt in reflecting criticisms that had been levelled against the Lisbon Agenda 
regarding the burgeoning bureaucratic nature of the attempt to move Europe forward, the 
core objective of which had translated into 28 core objectives and 117 indicators. In 
contrast to the report from the High Level Group
17 President Barroso’s communication 
clearly envisaged far greater focus as being essential to the success of Lisbon.  The 
Presidential address reiterated the main focus of Lisbon as being on ‘growth and jobs’ 
and outlined three major strategies or goals going forward.  These were to ensure that 
Europe became  a more attractive place to invest and work; that knowledge and 
innovation was at  the heart of European growth and  that policies were developed which 
allowed businesses to create more and better jobs. Similarly, the Communication from 
the Commission on the Social Agenda identified two priority areas: 
Moving towards full employment, increasing the quality and productivity of work 
and anticipating and managing change. 
                                                 
16 Eurostat Euro Indicators, April 2007. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page. Accessed May 7, 
2007. 
17 Included in an Annex to the report a great deal of matters and policy initiatives pursued under the 
umbrella of the Lisbon Agenda, ranging from Information Society initiatives, Environmental initiative, 
Education and so on. (HLG Report, Annex 3, 2004). 
  8A more cohesive society: equal opportunities for all.  
Although these documents did try to identify cause and effect factors regarding 
the relationship between legislation, regulation and economic performance in attempts to 
reach solutions to the mid-term problems faced by Lisbon, the reports were unsatisfactory 
in that it was not clear whether these cause and effect issues had been tested either on a 
statistical basis or an empirical basis.  The yardstick against which the European Union 
measures itself tends to be the performance of other large economic blocks such as the 
United States and Japan, but even though some comparative figures were given there was  
little evidence of an attempt to understand the reality of these comparative figures or to 
question what these comparative figures might teach us. There did not seem to be any 
evidence of a sustained comparative analysis or indeed of a sustained internal analysis.  
That is not to say that supporting research had not been carried out, the criticism being 
more based on the fact that it was difficult to glean from the reports the potential impact 
of solutions proffered even where these were expressed in more than vague aspirational 
terms, because the articulation of the issues or the likely effect of proposed solutions 
was not precise.  A further criticism is more substantive and that is that although the 
European policy makers were and are theoretically very confident of the European ‘social 
model’ and its virtues, there seems to be a crisis of confidence when comparative 
economic figures and the European experience are actually considered.
18  
 
Part II: 2007-2007 The emphasis on regulation 
However, since the reassessment of Lisbon in 2005 the focus advocated by President 
Barroso has been maintained and more specific problems have been addressed.  Thus the 
issue of regulation has become important and in 2005 the Commission established the 
framework for the better regulation movement: 
   “3.2. Making Europe a more attractive place to invest and work  
In order to attract more investment, generate employment and accelerate growth, it is 
important to facilitate market-entry within sectors and between Member States. The 
                                                 
18 For more detail of the types of issues which are being referred to here see Lynch-Fannon: supra n. 
  9Community will therefore give top priority to the completion of the internal market 
and to improving the regulatory environment as the two most important policy levers 
to create jobs and improve Europe’s growth performance.  
Better regulation has a significant positive impact on the framework conditions for 
economic growth, employment and productivity. By improving the quality of legislation, 
it creates the right incentives for business, cutting unnecessary costs and removing 
obstacles to adaptation and innovation. The measures foreseen in the ‘better regulation’ 
initiatives by the Commission and the Council Presidencies need to be implemented 
rapidly.  
The Commission will continue its work mainly in three areas:  
  • New policy initiatives in the Commission Legislative and Work Programme, such as 
white papers, legislative proposals and expenditure programmes, will all be subject of 
a solid impact assessment.  
  • Thorough screening of proposals pending before the Council/Parliament will lead 
potentially to modification, replacement or withdrawal of such proposals.  
  • Simplification of key existing legislation will be pursued and a new phase of the 
simplification programme will be launched on the basis of sectoral action plans.  
 
Inefficient regulation, difficult market access and insufficient competitive pressure can 
inhibit innovation in sectors with high growth potential and reduce benefits to consumers. 
The Commission therefore has launched a series of sectoral reviews to identify obstacles 
inhibiting growth and innovation in key sectors, with a particular view to SMEs. 
Moreover, the Commission will outline a new approach to taking SME concerns into 
account when proposing Community legislation and policies.”
19
  Clearly, the term regulation would generally cover both matters of legislative 
policy and the implementation and enforcement of such legislation.  In the debate on the 
relationship between regulation and competitiveness there are two very clearly distinct 
                                                 
19 From COM (2005) 330 final Communication from the Commission to the Parliament: Common Actions 
for Growth and Employment: The Community Lisbon Programme P. 7 
  10issues, one, the area of legislative policy and the second the issue of administrative 
burdens which are placed on business as a result of a particular legislative initiative. The 
issue of administrative burdens addresses how a particular piece of legislation is 
implemented and enforced. So for example it is possible to look at the amount of 
administration currently required in terms of compliance with Rule X, rather than coming 
to agreement as to whether Rule X is a good thing or not. In the EU documents these 
distinctions are described but even though regulation is identified as a problem the 
difficulties of identifying a satisfactory method of impact assessment ( a methodology 
which would allow us to weigh the cost of regulation against the benefits) have not been 
confronted  in a satisfactory manner in these documents.  This is not surprising.  Apart 
from what we could describe as the methodological difficulties of mapping the precise 
causative relationship between a particular legislative policy and competitive and 
economic outcomes
20 it is clear that within European political discourse a cost benefit 
analysis of legislative policy may yield results that put quite simply a lot of Europeans do 
not want to hear about. Not only that but identification of issues which might be linked to 
(or even blamed on) a particular legislative policy is politically sensitive within the 
Commission Directorates. These are the political difficulties. The combination of these 
‘methodological’ and ‘political’ questions makes addressing the policy questions slow 
and difficult. 
 
Methodological difficulties: The causative relationship between regulation and 
competitiveness 
There is a considerable body of academic literature regarding the role of 
regulation in supporting economic competitiveness, in supporting innovation, 
productivity and industrial growth.  Gilson in his seminal article identifies an important 
feature of Silcon Valley success as compared with the decline in activity around Route 
                                                 
20 From the excerpts above we can see that there are proposals to subject new policy proposals to ‘solid 
impact assessment’ but how this will be done in any satisfactory manner is not clearly outlined.  Experience 
with the practice in the UK and Ireland of what is now known as RIA (regulatory impact assessment) has 
yielded results which are the subject of much skepticism..See Copp, S. F. Company Law Reform: The Role 
of Regulatory Impact Assessment, presented at the SLS Conference September 2006.   Hower RIAs are not 
the subject matter of this paper, or any other mechanism for the assessment of new policy initiatives . 
 
 
  11128 in Massachussetts. In tracing the development of these two globally significant 
information technology regions, Gilson relies on concepts developed in earlier work of 
XX and YY and identifies economic agglomeration of the first and second stages as a 
useful analytical too.  The first state of economic agglomeration may be heavily reliant 
on technology transfer from significant universities to the industrialized sector.  In the 
case of Silicon Valley, Stanford University and in the case of Route 128, MIT. However, 
the second stage of economic agglomeration is not as dependent on this relationship for 
continued development. In this second stage the two regions began to diverge in the rate 
at which they continued to perform. Essential to this part of Gilson’s thesis as to why this 
difference occurred was the identification of continued employee mobility within Silicon 
Valley as a significant factor, contributing to the sharing and dissemination of knowledge 
amongst a group of experts. This feature of Silicon Valley had been identified by others 
who gave different reasons for the pattern of development. (see Hyde,
21 Saxenian) 
Gilson’s hypothesis was that the crucial defining factor in terms of differing success was 
a different legal approach to the enforceability of restraint of trade covenants in 
California as compared with Massachusetts.  In the former the fact that no-compete 
clauses are considered to be void was identified by Gilson as contributing significantly to 
the mobility of employees from one company to another, and that this contributed to the 
ability of employees to leave employment and engage in start up enterprises, and allowed 
consequently for the free flow of knowledge which, although valuable would be of a 
different category from the kind of knowledge which was protected by trade secret laws, 
( approximately similar in both states).  In Massachusetts in contrast there was no 
evidence of the same mobility of employees from one company to another, nor the same 
frequency of employees leaving to engage in start up or entrepreneurial activity. 
One can argue about whether Gilson’s hypothesis is really correct but the insight which 
he provides is profoundly engaging.  Firstly, the role of law or regulation in contributing 
to success is acknowledged as essential, particularly in what Gilson describes in the 
second stage of economic agglomeration and very interestingly he posits that the 
                                                 
21 Hyde, A: Real Human Capital: The Economics and Law of Shared Knowledge (May 1998)  unpublished 
manuscript referred to by Gilson….There may be many significant differences between Silicon Valley and 
Route 128. The apocryphal stories of brilliant men engaging in hugely successful start ups in garages, may 
also have to do with the availability of investment capital, other legal rules which facilitated venture capital 
investment and reward and so forth.   
  12regulatory infrastructure may be as important as innovation after what is described as the 
first stage of economic agglomeration which is much more naturally dependant on the 
quality of the original invention/innovation. A further insight provided by Gilson is that 
law is more important than ‘culture’  (the culture of employee mobility had been 
identified and described by Saxenian).
22 Or more importantly even that what had been 
identified as ‘the culture of employee mobility’ could be credibly explained by reference 
to the absence or presence of a particular legal rule.. A further insight which is appealing 
is that this serendipitous and significant regulatory difference occurred as a result of 
historical accident rather than as a result of any sustained planning and this in itself 
provides us with yet a further important insight and that is that sometimes the effect of 
regulation can be accidental and unintended and affects human behaviour in ways which 
seem inexplicable or unpredictable. 
 
The social model of economic progress as espoused by the Lisbon Agenda 
provides us with quite a few examples of the either accidental or unpredictable effects of 
regulation on human behaviour. I have discussed some of these internal conflicts within 
the European Lisbon Agenda elsewhere but one example will suffice here. The mid term 
review of Lisbon identified demographic changes as a huge challenge facing 
Europe‘….Europe must address the challenge of ageing populations which in the 
long-run will result in a considerable shrinking of the working-age population while 
increasing the share of retired persons.  Unless the decline in the size of the 
workforce is compensated by increases in labour productivity, potential growth will 
drop dramatically to around 1% by 2040…..Such a decline in economic 
performance together with a rise in age-related expenditures would put the 
European social model under considerable stress.’ (COM (2005) 330 final). 
Despite the apparent support for families in the European model, the demographic 
figures belie the expected impact these initiatives have had on the birth rate.  EU 
                                                 
22 AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 
(1994). Referred to by Gilson. 
 
 
  13Directives impose significant burdens on all employers (SMEs, large corporations etc.) in 
mandating maternity and parental leave for all employees. Harmonised standards across 
the EU ensure that these rights are available to all employees. (However, in many 
European countries the harmonisation of labour market regulation at EU level, represents 
a de minimis situation where workers’ rights and entitlements in many member states are 
significantly better than the minimum required under EC Directives). Furthermore 
Europeans enjoy mandated rights to four weeks annual vacation and there is also 
considerable regulation of working hours at European level under the Organisation of 
Working Time Directive.  On a national level considerable tax burdens are imposed on 
workers and business to finance family friendly social protection initiatives.  Childcare 
provision is publicly funded and supported in Europe. In the United States, in contrast, a 
system of individually based tax credits seems to be the primary source of financial 
support for childcare. Typically the European countries have early school starting ages, 
much more so than in the US.  Yet, total fertility trends in the EU-15 and EU 25 show a 
decline from the 1970s to 2000 where the average birthrate for both groups has declined 
to 1.5 per woman during the 1990s and into 2000. (High Level Group Report).  In the US 
in contrast, where there is little or no support for many workers in terms of family leave 
(paid or unpaid) or vacation leave the overall figure is much nearer 2 births per woman. 
Effectively despite considerable proactive positions in relation to protection against 
gender discrimination and the legalisation of positive discrimination provisions in favour 
of women
23 and despite generous mandated leave rights both relating to birth, childcare 
and annual leave, European women are choosing to stay at work and not have families.  
Older European women are choosing not to work at all.  In this regard the policies and 
resulting legislation seem to have had no positive impact. When looked at in a 
comparative light the relationship between family friendly policies, including legislation 
                                                 
23 In the context of the EU as a whole it is instructive to consider Articles 2(3) and Articles 2 (4) of the EC 
Directive 76/207 implementing equal treatment of men and women.  These two provisions exempt both 
maternity provision and positive discrimination provisions from the principle of equal treatment. Decisions 
of the European Court of Justice have approved of positive discrimination measures in favour of working 
women adopted in some member states, Case-450/93 Kalanke v Freie Hanestadt Bremen [1995] ECR I-
3051 and Case C-409/95 Hellmut Marschall v Land Nordhein Westfalen [1997] ECR I-6363. .  
Furthermore the ECJ has approved favourable treatment granted to women workers in the context of 
maternity, where such favourable treatment is specifically exempted from the broader gender equality 
agenda.  See Case 184/83 Hofman v Barmer Ersatzkasse [1984] ECR 3047.   See further Craig and de 
Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (OUP, 2003) Chapter 20. 
  14and other state funded and voluntary initiatives, does not make any sense at all.  The US 
presents an entirely different picture, indeed a labour market that some have described as 
downright ‘hostile’ to the family(Williams, 2002) and certainly very little planned 
support, yet a higher birth rate. Alot of legislation, regulation and no result. 
Nevertheless the solutions proposed by EU policy makers revert to the old belief 
that more regulation and more support will deliver, when already existing support has 
achieved very little. The experience of France in recent years and of the Nordic member 
countries are cited to support this approach, the report noting that “that France and the 
Nordic member states have higher fertility rates because of better provisions for 
combining child care and work, and partly because of family friendly policies.” 
Interestingly the Commission report shies away from pursuing what it describes as a 
‘natalist policy’, although in some respects it seems that the relative success in France is 
as a result of certain policies giving significant financial support (in some cases an 
amount of almost 20,000 Euro is available to support home care for children, this rate 
varies to this upward point from about 16,000 Euro per annum) to parents for childcare.
24
  The conclusion in this section is that attempts to tackle this big issue facing 
Europe again place faith in centralised managed planning, whether this is given 
expression in further regulation, adoption of further publicly funded social policies or a 
mixture of both.  The question raised is about the role of regulation in a social and 
cultural context. Whether imposing additional burdens on business and taxpayers can be 
justified in light of the doubts raised regarding correlation between regulation and 
outcome to date, particularly highlighted by the contrasting US experience. Is it the case 
that sometimes the effects of regulation can be unexpected, almost capricious and 
sometimes merely serendipitous? It must also be pointed out that even where planning 
does seem to have effects, there seems to be a crisis of confidence, as there is regarding 
youthful abstention from the workplace, in the EU between the outcomes of social 
policies pursued over the last four decades and what is now considered to be desirable 
economically.  Perhaps it is timely for those assessing the Lisbon strategy to clearly 
                                                 
24 See www.caf.fr for a complete list of specific financial supports provided under the French social 
security system ranging from allowances for each child, allowances for childcare, for annual return to 
school and so forth.  Accessed on July 20th, 2005. 
  15articulate its vision for Europe without yielding to what seems to be an institutional case 
of profound ambivalence.  
 
Political difficulties: The Future of the EU Social Model. 
The political difficulties are more complex.  As mentioned above the failure of the 
European Constitution highlighted the debate which is acutely felt amongst the citizenry 
of the European Union about what it means to be European.  During the French 
referendum on the Constitution the right and left of the political spectrum were allied in 
their opposition to the Constitution for different reasons.  The right argued that increased 
European domination would have a deleterious effect on the ‘Frenchness’ of France, 
opening her both culturally and politically to unwelcome influences.  The left had similar 
concerns regarding the domination of French political and cultural life by outside 
influences, but this was expressed in fears that ultimately this would lead to a dismantling 
of social protection and legislative in view of the continued liberalization of the social 
model perceived within the Commission.
25  Similar concerns (some of which are 
conflicting) were expressed in the Netherlands where the Dutch rejected the European 
Constitution in a referendum on June 1
st 2005. In a speech following this referendum, 
Prime Minister Balkenende explained what he saw as being Dutch concerns over Europe 
which included concerns about identity in light of rapid enlargement, concerns about the 
economic future of Europe compared with the US and China and concerns about the kind 
of European Union that we were facing: ‘One that focuses primarily on consolidation of 
vested interests, or one that pursues reform and displays solidarity with the less 
prosperous member states and the world around it?’ In addition, however, he made the 
clear point that the Netherlands was no longer happy to be the largest net contributer to 
financing the European Union.
26  
                                                 
25 Pech, Dr. L: Non-sense: France’s No to the European Constitution. 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2005/05/non-sense-frances-no-to-european.php
. “And above all, the French No is a patchwork of inconsistent claims: essentially a no to what is called 
“Anglo-Saxon” Europe and its “neo-liberal” policies, a no to unemployment and social dumping (the 
“Polish plumber”) and finally, a no to Turkey. With ideological absolutism on the left side of the political 
spectrum and a deeply unpopular government, these ingredients have proven fatal to the proposed 
European Constitutional Treaty” 
26 Balkenende, Dr. J. P: The Dutch Position in the EU.(21 July 2005) www.minaz.nl (Acessed 3.05.2007). 
  16A second aspect to the political difficulties regarding legislative policy becomes very 
evident in many debates at European level regarding future direction of legislative policy.  
Thus the Lisbon Agenda itself has fallen victim to a struggle between the focus on 
improving competitiveness and innovation within the European Union and maintaining 
the social model.  The burgeoning of the goals and actions which were forced into the 
Lisbon Agenda over time and which was decried by President Barrosso in his mid-term 
review is a classic case.  And it is even more interesting that President Barosso refocused 
the Agenda squarely on competitiveness and achieving economic growth. Even within an 
area as specialized but yet central to supporting business growth such as company law, 
the policy debate
27 rages on whilst the European Commission tries to take a more 
simplistic approach.
28
  
Part III: A more conservative approach to the problem of regulation 
 
A more focused approach. 
 
Chastened by experience of failed headline projects and harsh political debate as to the 
meaning of the European social model both within the Commission and across Europe, a 
more conservative approach has been adopted to the relationship between regulation and 
competitiveness. Building on the Commission’s position in 2005 described above, at the 
Spring Council this year,2007,  the EU initiated a more focused project addressing the 
burden of regulation in the context of competitiveness in the EU. In this document
29 a 
very clear distinction is made between addressing policy issues regarding new legislation 
or existing legislation and on the other hand addressing what is termed the compliance 
                                                 
27 Policy issues within the Company law sphere began with a bitter debate about corporate governance 
models, which raged through the 80s and saw the introduction of two failed directives seeking to 
incorporate the two tier board model into the European corporate model.  This was resisted vigorously by 
the UK and Ireland.  Further legislative initiatives have sought to introduce the two tier model by stealth 
such as the introduction of the SE Regulation, the introduction of Works Councils and Information and 
Consultation Directives…. Company Law Action Plan indicates the debate still rages and even a most 
recent project on One Share One Vote represents a division between the German dominated model and the 
UK model.  European Policy Forum document. Refs. 
28 See supra n. 24 
29 COM(2007)23 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European parliament, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions:Action Programme for Reducing Administrative 
Burdens in the European Union 
 
  17burden.  This project is clearly not about de-regulation. Thus the project puts to one side 
the issues and debates characterized as ‘political difficulties’ in the previous section. It 
states quite clearly that there is no ‘accepted method of addressing policy burdens.’ The 
report distinguishes what it terms impact assessment methodology (policy) and 
administrative burden methodology and clearly places confidence in the latter as a means 
of delivering results rather than the former. The goal is to reduce unnecessary  
compliance burdens across all member states and the document is quick to point out that 
not all compliance or administrative burdens experienced by businesses in particular 
member states are derived from EU legislation.  Thus ‘suppressing..unneccessary burdens 
at all levels…is a shared responsibility of the Member States and the European 
Institutions. The figures are astonishing; the document claims that by removing 
unnecessary compliance burdens GDP could be improved by 1.4% across the EU.    
 
Methodology 
 
The report describes a ‘bottom up’ approach by focusing on what it terms Information 
Obligations (IOs)  which are described as ‘building blocks’ as distinct from any 
legislation as a whole.  The project will ask member states to assess the burden of IOs 
placed on businesses by particular legislation and to reduce those where they are 
unnecessary because the information requirement is too frequent, yields information 
which is not important, (or outdated) or yields information which is repetitively required 
by different agencies.  It also identifies ‘business irritants’ which should be the focus of 
particular attention, i.e. IOs which businesses find particularly irritating for scrutiny.  
Most impressively however, the report actually identifies particular areas of concern
30 
and within these areas identifies particular pieces of EU legislation which ought to be 
addressed by member states in the short term
31. 
 
                                                 
30 These are Company (Corporate) Law, Pharmaceutical regulation; Working Environment/Employment 
legislation; Financial Services are the top four. 
31 Within Company Law, particular provisions of the 2
nd, 3
rd, 4
th and 6
th Directives primarily on accounting 
regulations and information providions.  Within Working Environment, Health and Safety information 
requirements; within Financial Services Directives regarding some aspects of the regulation of credit 
institutions. 
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The Dutch Experience 
 
The Netherlands has placed itself among the leaders in the field of reduction of 
administrative burdens in Europe.
32  The Government of the Netherlands set a target to 
reduce all administrative burdens arising from all areas of government administration by 
25% by 2007.  This figure was arrived at following the initiation of a full baseline 
measurement of administrative costs on businesses arising from regulation.  The 
measurement concluded that the total costs of administrative burdens was €16.4 bn (3.6% 
of Dutch GDP) and therefore a target reduction of 25% would yield a growth of Dutch 
GDP in the order of 1%.  The project, in its implementation, depends on two 
governmental bodies IPAL (Inter Ministerial Project Unit for Administrative Burdens) 
which is a cross departmental body and Actal (Dutch Advisory Board on Regulatory 
Burdens).  The main function of this body is to propose initiatives for the simplification 
of regulation.  Government departments must send Actal details of all new legislative 
proposals for review of the administrative costs calculation prior to the legislative 
proposal being sent to Parliament.  Actal also evaluates the administrative cost reduction 
programme which all government departments are obliged to send annually to Parliament 
At a recent meeting in Rotterdam the Dutch experience has been assessed by the OECD 
and by the World Bank, this assessment will be considered in the concluding section. 
33 
more here?? 
Developments in the UK
34
 
The Hampton Report published in the UK (May 2005)
35 considered the issue of reducing 
administrative burdens through what is described as ‘efficient regulation’ by improving 
approaches to regulatory inspection and enforcement. Strategies identified by Hampton 
for achieving this goal included  
                                                 
32 The regulatory reform project is run under the auspices of the Dutch Ministry of Finance www.minfin.nl 
in co-operation with the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs www.minaz.nl.  It has a dedicated website 
www.compliancecosts.com run under the Ministry of Finance. (all sites accessed 04.05.2007).  
33 Philip Hampton, Chairman of J. Sainsbury plc: Reducing Administrative Burdens: Effective Inspection 
and Enforcement, HM Treasury, 2005. 
34 HM Government: Simplification Plans: A Summary. December 2006. 
35  
  19•  a risk based regulatory function, for example this would include identifying firms 
with greater risk of non compliance which could be identified and distinguished 
from those with less risk.. 
•  information obligations should be simplified and reduced in frequency of returns 
•  data requirements including the design of forms should be coordinated across 
regulators. 
reduce the number of regulators, specifically in the UK 31 national regulators 
should be reduced to 7 thematic bodies.
36
•  New regulations and regulatory activities should be implemented in accordance 
with principles set out in the report. 
In Scotland, the Davidson Review was published in November 2006
37 which made 
specific recommendations in relation to specific legislative areas….(but this sort of 
piecemeal approach is the least efficient way of reducing regulatory and compliance 
burdens and could have been pre-empted by a more immediate EU response).  The 2007 
EU Commission document actually does identify some key legislative areas and some 
key pieces of legislation which are to be addressed by all member states and it would 
certainly avoid duplication of effort if this template was followed…ie that knowledge 
was shared across the EU regarding particularly burdensome areas of legislation, because 
there is a high likelihood that similar patterns of onerous information obligations are 
identified. After all the EU is responsible for a lot of legislation and consequently 
administrative burdens. In the Irish experience for example, the UK have agreed to 
provide us with details of the 300 areas of regulation which accounted for 70% of the 
work and that sort of information sharing is efficient and renders the baseline 
measurement exercise a lot less costly.  
The Macrory Review published in November 2006
38 followed up on the Hampton Report 
recommendation to adopt a risk based approach to enforcement, in particular through the 
identification of firms less likely to comply and those with a good track record of 
                                                 
36 “Regulatory bodies at national and local level enforce regulations in the UK. As discussed above, 
including both levels there are 61,000 people working for 674 regulatory bodies within the scope of the 
review. They have a combined budget of around £4 billion..”. 
Hampton Para 1.10 
37 Lord Neil Davidson, the Advocate General for Scotland. 
38  
  20compliance.
39  Thus businesses in the UK that comply will benefit from light touch 
enforcement, whereas non compliant businesses will face tough rigorous penalties. These 
recommendations have led to the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 (passed 
by Parliament in November) designed to facilitate a risk based approach to regulatory 
enforcement and to provide for a quick and easy reduction of administrative burdens 
process. Tt also introduces a statutory basis for a code of conduct for regulators, 
implements on a statutory footing five principles of good regulation and also provides for 
a more simplified process for the transposition of EU directives.. 
 
 
The criteria adopted subsequently by the Better Regulation exercise in the UK in relation 
to administrative burdens include the following:
40
  Measuring the cost of administrative (or ‘red tape’) burdens on business. 
  Reducing regulators and inspectorates from 31 national bodies to 7 (this is one of 
the most significant recommendations). 
  Legislation to speed up the process of de-regulation and make EU transposition 
easier. 
  Tougher scrutiny of new regulatory measures. 
The Standard Cost Model 
 
The method used to measure the cost of administrative burdens is called the SCM 
(Standard Cost Model)
41 which was developed in the Netherlands and which has been 
adopted in the UK and by the European Commission in 2007. It is described by its 
                                                 
39 Risk based enforcement has been adopted effectively in Ireland by the Office of Director of Corporate 
Enforcement which has adopted a policy of identifying habitual non complying companies but also has 
adopted a policy of identifying firms, accounting in this case, which seem to be advisors of non compliant 
companies, www.cro.ie and www. odce.org. 
40 www.betterregulation.gov.uk
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/regulation
 
 
41 International SCM Network site: www.administrative-burdens.com
 
  21proponents as a ‘Simple, pragmatic framework for measuring costs’ and is described as 
being ‘Indicative not statistically representative’. It begins by identifying information 
obligations under particular pieces of legislation and then costs the internal and external 
costs of producing the information and returning it to the relevant government 
department. The internal cost is a function of time and the cost of external advisors, or 
internal employees used to generate the information, this is then multiplied by the number 
of businesses affected and the frequency of the information requirement.  (the cost of 
processing the information within each department is not as yet factored into the cost).  
In the Netherlands and the UK the scope of their SCM work extended beyond business to 
include the voluntary sector, charities and so forth but the EU Commission has, in the 
first phase, delimited the approach to business only. This more focussed approach is 
desirable given the emphasis on business competitiveness and the complexity of the task 
in hand. 
 
Part IV: Likely stumbling blocks 
 
  
  In this concluding part of the paper it is intended to address a number of issues 
regarding the better regulation project as it relates to this particular area of administrative 
and regulatory burden reduction.  It must be emphasised that these points are made by 
way of a general commentary on this initiative on the part of the EU Commission, 
influenced as it is by the Dutch experience and to a lesser extent by the UK experience.  
In some cases the issues arise because the nature of the project is sometimes 
misunderstood, in other cases the issues arise because of limitations which are inherent in 
an initiative such as this. The main goal is to highlight these issues so that we can 
critically assess the potential of the project. 
 
The function of law 
 
Sometimes there is a limited understanding of the function of regulation and law. 
Not all regulations are definitively addressed to market failure, For example consumer 
protection and environmental protection legislation as we know it would never 
  22necessarily be delivered either by what economic theorists call a perfect market or an 
imperfect market.  The function of legislation can be viewed through different 
philosophical prisms and many of the comments from proponents of the better regulation 
movement are firmly rooted it what would be called a law and economics, neo liberal 
philosophy which is fine (if you like that sort of thing) but not necessarily the only way 
of looking at law. In its limited and unsophisticated form this school of thought basically 
assumes that all regulation which imposes a cost on business without yielding benefits to 
business is unnecessary. It is very dominant in the United States at present and tends to 
support a non-interventionist approach to the market by government. For example under 
the EU social model, much employment and social legislation is passed to address issues 
not particularly addressed very coherently either through the prism of market failure or 
market efficiency. Many US commentators would be of the view that the US labour 
market works very well without all the protective legislation we have in Europe. Under 
the market failure view of regulation all these EU initiatives would be regarded as an 
unjustified intervention in the market rather than addressing market failure and this area 
would be considered a prime area which could be de-regulated. (There is, needless to say, 
a vast body of academic literature on this subject)! On the other hand the more 
sophisticated proponent of the better regulation movement accepts that better regulation 
is not primarily about policy and less so about de-regulation.  It will take the viewpoints 
of those supporting regulation on board and moreover accepts that regulation is also 
necessary to achieve goals other than competitiveness, innovation and productivity. 
Interestingly in the US agencies such as the OMB
42 and the OIRA
43 which have been 
involved in this kind of exercise for many years state quite clearly that there are functions 
of regulation that are necessary which might be considered burdensome by business in 
some respects but that in the better regulation field the primary focus is on administrative 
burdens not policy driven burdens.
44
                                                 
42 US Office of Mangement and Budget 
43 US Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. 
44 For details on the US experience see Hunt, Alex: From Cutting Red Tape to Maximizing Net Benefits. 
(Presentation made at Rotterdam, The Netherlands, March 1 2007). See further 2006 Final Report to 
Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulaion 
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2006_cb/2006_cb_final_report.pdf 
  23Nevertheless it is possible and there is an inherent danger that any exercise of this 
kind can be high jacked by the neo-liberalist view which is against big government and 
regulatory intervention. COM(2007) is very clear about making sure that the better 
regulation project is not captured in this way.   
 
“This Action Programme is not about deregulation. Nor does it aim to change 
policy objectives set out in the existing Community legislation or the level of ambition in 
existing legislative texts. Rather it represents an important effort to streamline and make 
less burdensome the way in which policy objectives are implemented – one important 
measure of the quality of regulation at every level. Unnecessary and disproportionate 
administrative burdens can have a real economic impact. They are also seen as an irritant 
and a distraction for business and are often identified as a priority target for 
simplification. The Commission is committed to assist in suppressing these unnecessary 
burdens at all levels and underlines that this is a shared responsibility of the Member 
States and the European Institutions.”
45
 
In the UK, the various reports referred to above acknowledge the policy 
implications agenda also.  Interestingly the COM(2007) document represents a ‘no 
compromise’ approach to social Europe. The policy issues will be addressed elsewhere 
through RIAs and such exercises.  This is an advantage but indeed a serious limitation of 
the SCM type exercise,, it really does not bite the bullet on the big questions. 
 
 
Distinctions between small and medium enterprises and larger enterprises. 
 
The fact that the better regulation project is not about policy but more about 
administrative and compliance burdens has clear advantages, but these advantages are 
also its limitations. The regulation of small businesses is a big issue here. Small 
businesses are viewed by many as the drivers of knowledge based economies and one of 
the issues which Europe will have to face is whether all businesses should be treated 
similarly in areas of regulation where it is legitimate to argue that small businesses should 
be exempt from some regulation. In the context of other areas of regulation such as 
revenue and company law, it has been accepted that small and medium enterprises should 
and can be treated differently to larger enterprises in relation to particular kinds of 
                                                 
45 Supra n. p. 2. 
  24requirements, for example specific disclosure requirements in company law. In the UK 
DTI Company Law Reform project, which is now represented in the new Companies Act 
2006 (December 2006) the slogan which was adopted was ‘Think Small First’
46.  This 
has been used in other contexts also and it might be something which could drive reform 
of burdensome compliance requirements for smaller entrepreneurial firms.  In relation to 
the task in hand exemptions are required to feed into lessening the administrative burden 
on small businesses and a risk based approach to enforcement might do something to 
answer this.  Hampton
47 was very strong on this point:  
“The most worrying aspect of research on the burden of regulation is the extent to 
which burdens are felt disproportionately in smaller businesses. This is a key concern for 
Government, as the creation and continuance of smaller businesses is an essential part of 
productivity growth. Particularly worrying is regulation’s impact on business owners’ 
desire to start and grow their businesses. Small firms are keen to grow – two-thirds want 
to expand in the next five years – but half see regulation as ‘a serious barrier to growth’. 
(Lifting the barriers to growth in UK small businesses, Federation of Small Businesses, 
2002.; SBRC/Natwest survey of small businesses, 2003.) Four in ten companies 
questioned by SAP in 2004 believed that red tape was ‘stifling their growth’, while 
Small Business Service research suggests that around a third of adults who think about 
starting a business view the complexity of regulation as a barrier to 
entrepreneurship.
48(Better regulation, is it better for business, Robert Baldwin/Federation 
of Small Businesses, 2004). 
  The issue of exempting small businesses will inevitably however, become a 
policy issue and if the better regulation project isolates itself from policy questions it will 
face its limitations sooner rather than later.  For example, in the US, firms with less than 
50 employees are exempt from some elements of employment law, e.g the Federal 
                                                 
46 www.dti.gov.uk/company 
47 Supra n. “This burden is felt most heavily in smaller businesses. A recent NatWest survey claimed that a 
business with two employees spends over six hours per month per employee on Government regulation and 
paperwork, while a business with over 50 employees spends only two hours per employee. 
(SBRC/NatWest survey of small business, 2003.) Research by the OECD suggests that the same is true 
internationally, with businesses with fewer than 20 staff bearing a burden five times greater than businesses 
with more than 50 staff.” (From Red Tape to Smart Tape, OECD, 2003.)  
 
 
48 Ibid. p. 25 
  25Family and Maternity Leave Act, an exemption which would be unthinkable for most 
Europeans who would be of the view that these sorts of rights should be universally 
available to all employees, irrespective of the nature of their employment. But 
nevertheless the concept of significant exemptions for small businesses is something 
which has to be considered and will have to be addressed. 
 
Is it just another costly bureaucratic exercise?  
 
One reservation which has been expressed about the better regulation project and 
the SCM method is that the costs of the exercise are in themselves significant.  In the UK 
the costs of doing the baseline measurement has been estimated at £30 million.  As in 
many other areas of activity the EU initiatives in this area are characterised by a belief in 
the effectiveness of top-down, centralised managed planning. The emphasis on 
government directed ‘dirigiste’ planning in relation to encouraging innovation and 
business competitiveness can be contrasted in a general way with actions in other trading 
blocs, most notably the US.  In particular the EU model emphasises the ‘federal’ aspect 
of the dirigiste approach whereas the liberalist tradition of limited government, which is 
particularly dominant in US political culture at present, gives expression to some political 
scepticism regarding such an approach.  Scepticism about the costs of the better 
regulation exercise measured against possible benefits is not misplaced.  In the Dutch 
model as in the UK model it is for example envisaged that there would be a core group of 
civil servants employed in each government department to progress the project, in itself a 
costly expense. However, some steps can be taken to reduce these costs by having 
member states share information from one to the other on baseline measurement 
exercises.  Secondly, the Commission approach following the Spring Council 2007 of 
identifying specific pieces of legislation which all member states should consider at the 
same time reduces the dangers of repetitiveness and inefficiencies.  The danger of the 
better regulation exercise, particularly as regards business competitiveness, becoming yet 
another costly and ineffective bureaucratic exercise is a real one and steps must be taken 
to control that danger. . 
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Are the benefits overstated? 
 
  Some of the difficulties with the regulatory burden approach highlighted here 
were also brought to the fore in a recent OECD and World Bank
49 assessment of the 
Dutch experience.  In the assessment the OECD called for a ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’ 
of the Dutch project but in doing so there seemed to be a failure to recognise that the 
Dutch project is limited but deliberately so.  Similarly the Commission project launched 
this Spring is limited along the same lines as the Dutch model, again with a view to being 
effective.  The limitations are and will continue to be criticised because they are 
misunderstood but also it is legitimate to ask questions as to whether the limited approach 
is sufficient in the long run to improve competitiveness in Europe. In its assessment of 
the Dutch project the OECD and World Bank emphasised some future goals such as 
considering the balance between ‘different societal goals’  and the point was made that 
‘political neutrality could not longer be guaranteed’ in the exercise. It also called for a 
consideration of the cost-benefit analysis of regulation.  This is the essential difficulty of 
this exercise, it is good but perhaps not enough. The OECD and World Bank assessment 
did not seem to appreciate the deliberately limited objectives. More appropriately to the 
better regulation project as it is now defined, the OECD called for a consideration of 
benefits which could be reaped from further IT initiatives.  It also called for a 
consideration of the cost to governments of regulation, as it is clearly costly to collect and 
manage information and data. The OECD and World Bank group also called for 
consideration of the enforcement costs in the area of regulation also. The Dutch response 
has been to highlight the positive aspects of the assessment and to emphasise suggestions 
which can be delivered within the regulatory burden model such as ‘increasing focus on 
opportunities provided by ICT’ and to continue to work on burdens ‘emanating from 
local authorities and Europe’
50 The response seems to be that even if the OECD and 
World Bank group were not quite clear as to the goals of the SCM and regulatory burden 
project the Dutch government certainly were! 
The Acquis and Enlargement issues. 
                                                 
49 Administrative Simplification in the Netherlands-Main findings of the OECD and World Bank Group: 
‘Challenges of Cutting Red Tape. Rotterdam, March 1 2007. 
50 www.compliancecosts.com 
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Finally, we should not underestimate the complexity of a pan-European project 
such as this at it applies to each individual member state.  The project will of course be 
embraced with varying degrees of enthusiasm given the costs of the exercise, varying 
stakeholder responses and so forth.
51 Furthermore it must be borne in mind that as of 
2004 a number of acceding countries are still struggling with implementation of the 
acquis and with their role as governments with an input into European policy 
developments. Nowak-Far describes the internal difficulties regarding accession to the 
EU and implementation of the acquis, not to mention the burdens of participating in 
debate on future policy direction in Poland, one of the largest of the accession states 
acceding on May 1
st 2004 see Nowak-Far.
52 The difficulties and challenges faced by 
other much smaller countries must be considerable. For these countries compliance with 
EU implementation requirements is an enormous burden, engaging in a process of 
dismantling regulatory and administrative burdens  will be a costly, complicated business 
which might be well down the line of priorities. Arising from this the idea of minimum 
necessary compliance, rather than maximum burdensome compliance is something which 
the Commission have alluded to increasingly over the last two years and it is an 
important element of optionality which has been preserved.  
Conclusion 
  Finally, the potential contribution of the reduction of regulatory burden is 
significant.  It is an exercise which is relatively tightly circumscribed and for that reason, 
despite its limitations, it is more likely to succeed.  The Dutch experience has 
demonstrated the benefits to be gained.  The EU has chosen to adopt the Dutch model 
and this has to a great extent been embraced by the UK, although the burden reduction 
project is part of the better regulation bigger picture there. There is no reason on balance 
to believe that such a project can succeed across the EU, as long as we do not expect it to 
deliver more than it can. 
                                                 
51 In the Irish experience, reservations were expressed about the costs of the baseline measurement 
exercise. In addition surveys of businesses yielded different responses.  A recent ESRI report for example 
reported that businesses felt the amount of regulation was ‘about right’ which contrasts particularly with the 
results of similar surveys made during the Hampton Review and with responses received by other 
surveyors in Ireland. 
52 Nowak-Far: Co-ordination of European policy in Poland: The importance of pth dependence and 
increasing returns for the determination of European ‘viability’.  (Presented at EUSA Austin TX May 2005. 
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